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A atattc neoclasatcal atructuraL model ia preaented, ezplainfng Zabour
suppLy o~ both spousea fn tmo aduLta houaehoLda. Family preferences are
described ín terms o~ a dfrect translog houaehold utflfty junetion, mith
the husband'a letaure, the r~i1e's letaure, and famiZy consumer
expenditurea as ita argumenta. We asawne that the chofce aet for each
famity eonatata o1 a finite number o~ potnta (c,.im,~f), ~uhere .im and ,~~
are the huaband's and mi~e'a houra o1 Zefaure per rueek and e is famity
income, ~here aeeount is taken of the main featurea of the Duteh tax
sgstem. Zn the basíc model, error terma are tncorporated in the same axiy
as in the multinomtal logft model. Compared to modela daveZoped earlíer in
the Literature, this modeL has several advantagea. Sfnee tangency
condittons and dualfty theory are not needed, cohereneg of the modeZ ts a
priorí guaranteed. No parameter reatrtetions have to be ímpoaed, and
regularfty of prelerencea can be teated. IYoreover, the model ís an
adequate lrameawrk to bufZd tn extenatons and a more general error
structure.
We diacusa aeveraZ extenafona, fn mhích me alZom 1or hours
reatricttona and random pre~erencea, and account for the fact that r,iage
ratea of non-uiorkera are not obaerued. Eatimatton o~ some o~ the extended
models by exact ML is intractable aince ft involves integratíng out the
unobserved error terma. Znatead, the Zíkelíhaod fitnetfon ís approxtmated,
repLacing the integral by a mean baaed on random drams. The models are
estimated uaing crosa-seetfon data on Dutch JamiZtes lrom 1987. Results
are eompared uatng eatimated eonffdence bounda o1 Labour auppZy
eZastieities for the average ~amtly.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the neoclaeaical static model of individual labour
supply has received a lot of attention. See e.g. Moffitt (1990e) for a
collection of applicationa to European and US data aets. Issuea such as the
impact of non-linear taxation, fixed costs of working, unemployment
benefits, measurement errora, unobserved preference variation, endogeneity
of wage rates, and inatitutional or demand side restrictions on hours
worked, have been addresaed extensively in the individual framework. For
households with two adults, the usual approach in empirical work is to
analyse male and female labour supply recursively: The husband is assumed to
decide first, without taking account of e.g. the wife's wage rate, and the
wife decides conditionally upon her husband's labour supply and earnings.
This approach for example imposes the a prfort restriction that the
elasticity of the husband's labour supply with respect to the wife's wage
rate or, in case of hours restrictions, her working hours, is equsl to zero.
During the past decades, labour market participation of females in The
Netherlands has atrongly increeaed (both measured in terms of hours worked,
and measured in the number of people with a paid job), while average working
hours of males have decreased substantially. In an influentiel recent
report, the government is advised to consider several policy measurea (tax
en beneflts reforma, child care improvementa, etc.) to stimulate female
labour aupply and a more equal distribution oF paid work emong spousea (WRR,
1990)-
In order to etudy the impact of such policy measurea, e model in which
labour aupply of both spouaes is modeled aimultaneously seems more
eppropriate than the single individusl model. The natural extension of the
structural version of the latter, is the model based on joint utility
maximisation of a household utility function, with family conaumer
expenditurea, the husband's leisure end the wife's leisure as its arguments.
This is the framework which we use in this paper.l)
Compared to the large number of empirical applicationa of the aingle
individual model, the applications of the two adulta model are scarce.
Exceptions are Hausman and Ruud (1984), Ransom (1987, 1989), end Kapteyn et
al. (1990). Gertler and Newman (1991) estimate a generalisation for the case
that more than two family members supply labour. In all these models, hours
worked by the two spouses are treated as mixed discrete and continuous
random variables. Tangency conditions are used to solve the family's joint
utility maximisation problem. Second order conditions must be satisfied in-z-
order to make this a valid approach. If, for example, nonnegativity of the
Slutaky matrix ia violated, aolving the ayatem oP tangency conditiona no
longer corresponda to miximising direct utility. Morewer, the system
tangency conditiona may have zero or more than one solutions. Thus, as ín
the aingle individuel model, paremeters muat satisPy restrictiona to
guarantee model coherency (cP., e.g., Blundell, 1990, and Van Scest et el.,
i99z). As a consequence, flexibility of the preference apecification can be
reduced substantislly.
Moreover, the continuous Premework impliea that utility maximisation
becomea intricate in cese of non-atandard reatrictiona. Allowing Por more
general budgot seta (non-linear taxation, joint filing, unemployment
benefits, fixed coata, hours constraínta) leads to an essentially more
complicated model. This limita the extent to which policy measurea can be
enalysed. Model tractability arguments have also affected the sophistication
of the stochastic specifications used. Random preferences, optimisation
errors, and meesurement errors due to incomplete wage observationa, have not
yet been incorporated simultaneously.
In this paper, labour aupply is treated as a diacrete random variable.
The approach ia related to the work of e.g. Dickens and Lundberg (1985),
1Lmmera end Woittiez (1991), end Ven Scest et al. (1990) on the single
individusl model. Working houra per week of both spouses are grouped, such
that the choice set of each family consiata of a finite number of leisure
income combinations only. Utility ia thus maximised over a finite set. The
disadvantage of making the rounding error is, in our view, more then
compensated by the simplicity of the resulting utility maximisation problem.
We do not rely on tangency conditions and coherency of the model is
automatically guaranteed. Specific features of the budget set due to
taxation, unemployment benefita, or hours constraints, can be handled
without esaentially complicating the model. Thus the approach remains fully
atructurel, in the sense that all policy aimulations which sre possible in
the continuous model can also be carried out with this model.
In order to be able to enrich the atochastic specification of the
model, we apply approximate !Q, estimation using aimulated frequencies, as
discussed by Lerman end Manski (1981) and Gourieroux et al. (1990). This
allowa for the simulteneous incorporation of several types of errors.
Varioua specifications of the model are estimated and compared, in terms of
the extent to which they fit the data, as well as in terms of their
implicationa for own and cross wage and income elasticitiea of labour supply
of the two spouses.-3-
The paper ia organised as followa. The baeic model 1s preaented in
section 2. Date and some detaila of the incorporated tax and benefite
syatems, which approximate the actusl systems in the Netherlanda. are
described in aection 3. In section 4, we present the eatimation reaulta of
the basic model. In section 5, we discusa aeveral extenaiona oP the model.
We consider more general atochastic structures and incorporation of hours
constraints. Section 6 concludea.
2. The Basíc Model
We asaume that each individuel can freely chooae emong the alternatives
in the choice set of leiaure income combinations {(c~,lm~,lf~);
j-1,2,...,m}. Here 1mf~TE-hm~ and 1f3~TE-hf~, where TE is the (fixed) time
endowment, set equal to 80 hours per week, and hm~ and hf3 are working hours
per week of husband end wife, respectively. We only consider numbers of
working houra which are multiples of some fixed interval length IL, i.e.
hm~-jmIL, for some jmE{0,...,mind-1}, and hf~~jfIL, with jfE{0,....mind-1}.
The choice set thus contains m~mZind ~inta. In the data, most integer values
of actuel working houra between ~ end 60 are present, and IL-1 would seem a
natural choice. In the empirical part of this paper however, we choose ILr12
or ILz10, in order to limit the computational burden of the estimation
procedure. Correspondingly, mind is set equal to 5 or 6, and the number of
choice opportunities is 25 or 36.
c~ denotes the family's after tax income, including husband's and
wife's earnings, posaible unemployment benefita, unearned family income such
as child ellowances, etc.2) Detaila on included taxes and benefita are
presented in the next section. For the moment, the before tax wage rate is
treated as an observed exogenous variable for ell individuals, including
non-workers.
We work with the following direct trenslog specification of the direct
utility function:
U(v) s v'Av . b'v (2,1)
where v-(log c, log lm, log lf)' is the vector of loga of commodity
quantities, A is e symmetric 3x3 matrix with entries ai~ (i,jr1,2,3), and
b3(51,~2,53)'. Preference variation across families through observed
characteristics can be incorporated through the paremeters:-4-
Pi ' F Pikxk' i~l'2.3. ai~~ F ai~kxk. i,j~1,2,3. (2.2)
1Y~e xk 's reflect family characteristics, such as family compoaition or the
huaband's or wife's age. The index indicating the family is auppreased. In
the empirical analysis, some of the parameters will be assumed to be
constant acrosa femiliea to reduce the computational burden.
For given A and b, it ia atraightforward to derive the region in
(c,lm,lf) space where U is quasi-concave. If U ia increasing in c, it is
quasi-concave at (c,lm,lf) if end only if HC ia positive definite, where HC
denotes the matrix of second order derivatives of c with respect to lm and
lf, along the indifference surface at (c,lm,lf):
HC --u~l I~lm ~ ~ J
Hu ~~1m Ó 0 J
. (2.3) l lf lf
Here Uc ia the partial derivative of U with respect to c, HU denotes the
matrix of second order partial derivatives of U, and
clm--Ulm~Uc ~d clf--
U1f~Uc are the marginal rates of substitution of male and female leisure
with family consumption. All derivatives are evaluated at (c,lm,lf). They
are easily obtained from (2.1).
In the discrete choíce model at hand, convexity of preferences plays no
role. Utility maximisation takes place over a finite set, end neither first
nor second order conditions are required. On the other hand, the economic
interpretation of the model would be lost if the monotonicity condition
that, in some 'relevant region' of (c,lm,lf) space, (including, e.g., all
sample observations), U is increasing in c, is not fulfilled. The reason is
that in defining the choice set, interior pointa of the budget set are
already excluded. U is increasing in c at (c,lm,lf) if and only if
2(alllog c{ a211og lm . a311og lf) t pl ) 0 (2.4)
Since coherency of the model is guaranteed whether (2.4) is satisfied or
not, it is not necessary to impoae (2.4) a priort. Thus, neither (2.3) nor
(2.4) have to be imposed. It can be checked ex poat whether the estimates
imply that these restrictions are satisfied or not. If (2.3) is not
satisfied, there is nothing to worry about, since our economic model
accounts for that. If (2.4) is violated, we hsve to reconsider our economic
model.-5-
Imposing (2.3) or (2.4) involves imposing a number of inequslity
restrictions on the parametera of the model. This limita the flexibility of
the locally second order flexible translog specification. Moreover, if (2.3)
is used, these restrictions will be data dependent. The use of tengency
conditions requires impoaition of this type of restrictiona to guarantee
model coherency. The approach followed in thia paper ia en attractive way to
avoid this. Flexibility ia retained, computational tractability ís retained,
and the economic constraints (2.3) and (2.4) can be tested.
Random disturbances are added to the utilities of all choice
opportunities in the seme way as in the well-known multinomial logit model
(cf., e.g., Maddala, i983):
U~ ~ U(c~,lm~.lf~) ~ E~. (~al,...,m) í2.5)
E~~ EV(I) (j-1,...,m), el,...,em independent,
where EV(I) denotes the type I extreme value diatribution with cumulative
probability function Pr[E~(e]-exp(-exp(-e)) ( eER). We asaume that the family
chooses j for which U~ is largest. The probability that j is chosen is then
given by
m
Pr[U~~Uk for all k~j] : exp(U(c~,lmf,lf~))~kFlexp(U(ck,lmk,lfk)) (2.6)
Properties of this EV(I) distribution imply E{E~}~0 and V{e~}-rtZ~6. The
assumption that all variances are equal obvioualy limits the flexibility of
the error structure of the model. However, it is necessary to obtain the
simple expressiona for the probabilities in (2.6). The choice of the
magnitude of the common variance can be interpreted as a normalisation.
Equivalently, one of the parameters of the utility function could be
normalised, and V{e~} could be estimated as a parameter. The chosen
normalisation has the advantage that the sign of the normalised paremeter is
known a prforf.
The error structure of the model can be compared with the one in the
more traditional kinked budget constraint continuous models, which ususlly
include either random preferences or optimisation errors or both.3)In the
case of family labour aupply, both types of errors would typically be
bivariate, with a univaríate term for each spouse.The assumption of independence of irrelevant alternativea (IIA), is an
iaplicit assumption for the multinomiel logit model. Because of the IIA
essumption, the Ej's strictly cannot be interpreted as reflecting random
preferences, which could for example be due to unobserved femily
characteriatica.4) A natural way to interpret the Ej's is the assumption
that they represent unobserved alternative specific utility components. In
this cese, the Uj's represent the actuel utilities, and there are no
optimisation errora. Alternatively, they could be interpreted as
optímisation errors, implying that the actuel utilitiea are given by
U(cf,lm ,lfj) end do not contain a random component. Because
P[Ui~Uj~U(ci,lmi,lfi),U(cj,lmj,lfj)] depends on U(ci,lmi,lfi)-U(cj,lmj,lfj)
and not on, for example, lmi and lmj, the errora cannot be interpreted as
measurement errors on observed working hours.
Still, the large number of errors incorporated, one for each
alternative, suggests that in estimating the model these errors might very
well pick up part of the random preferences effects, and it may be hard to
distinguish random preferences from optimisation errors in practical
estimation. This problem sometimes also arises in the single individual
kinked budget constraint model. Explicit incorporation of random preferences
by adding error terms to p2 and ~3 will be discussed in section 5.
3. Data and Budget Sets
The data we use stem from the Socio Economic Panel (SEP) wave drawn in
October 1987 and were collected by the Netherlends Central Hureau of
Statistics. We only use observations concerning families with at least
husband and wife, with both partners between 16 end 65 years of age. AFter
eliminating a few observationa with missing values of explanatory variables,
2859 families remained. In 13.OX of these femilies, neither spouse has a
paid job. In 3.1X of all cases, only the wife works. In 49.7X of all cases,
only the huaband works, and in the remaining 34.1X of all cases, both
spouses have a paid job.
Working hours include regular overtime if it is paid, as well ea hours
worked in secondary jobs. They refer to the usuel working week and thus do
not correct for the number of holidays, etc. For 20 males and 17 females, it
ia known that he or she has a paid job, but the number of working hours
could not be retrieved. The 33 families of these individuals are retained in
the sample. Likelihood contributions of these families can easily be
adjusted to take account of the missing information.-~-
After tax earnings include allowances for ahift work, paid overtime,
tips, etc. Before tax wage rates are computed from after tax eernings and
hours worked, using an approximation of (the inverse of) the Dutch taxation
system. For approximately 8X of working males and 6X of working females, no
wage rate could be computed. Most of theae people did not answer the
earnings questions, not being salarled employees.
We distinguish two types of (after tax) femily income other than the
husbend's and wife's earnings: child benefits and other income, mainly
capital income. Income of other household membera is not included. It is
thus assumed that, for example, earnings of children do not affect the
husband's and wife's labour supply decisiona. The husband's end wife's
unemployment benefits are alao excluded from the other income measure. Some
sample atatistics on participation rates, working hours, wage rates, other
income, and a number of individusl and family characteristics are mentioned
in table 1. There appears to be a signíficantly negative correlation between
other family income (excluding child benefits) end male and female working
hours and participation.
In order to compute the complete budget seta, we assume that before tax
wage rates do not depend on hours worked, implying that, due to the tax
system, average aPter tax wage ratea are decreasing. This assumption can in
principle be generaliaed along the lines of Moffitt (1984) and TLmmers and
Woittiez (1991), who find that after tax earnings are an S-shaped function
of houra worked, implying lower before tax wage ratea for part-time jobs.
This extension is beyond the acope of this paper.
The Dutch 1987 tax aystem for individuala basically consists of eleven
tax brackets, with marginal tax ratea gradually increasing from 0 to 70x.
Some simplifying assumptions are necessary for our purposes, since the data
do not contain all neceasary information on deductables, health inaurence
premiums, etc. Spouses file aeparately, but the width of the huaband's tax-
free bracket is incresaed if hia wife dces not work, or if her earnings are
extremely low (and vice versa). This impliea that, if the husband's earnings
are given and are not too small, the first part oF the wife's budget aet is
virtually horizontal. On average, this concerns approximately her first four
houra of work per week. In the current policy debate, this non-convexity in
the female's budget set is seen as one of the reasons for the relatively low
rate of female labour market participation in The Netherlands (cf. WRR,
1990),5)
The data contain information on varioua types of unemployment benefits
for those who are actually unemployed. On the other hand, there ia no-8-
luforrntion on whnt aomeone would recelve i!' he or ahe were to becumu
unemployed. Since the level of unemployment benefits atrongly depends on
someone's labour market history, we feel that it may very well be correlated
with time persistent unobserved indívíduel characteristics. To avoid these
problems, we have only taken into account the unemployment assistance a
femily receivea when family income, excluding child benefits, is below the
official poverty line for s two adults household without children, which is
about 50x of average after tex earnings of working malea in the sample.
Child benefits then make up for the differences between the poverty lines
for families with and without children. Unemployment inaurence benefits,
which generally have limited duration, are thus ignored.6) This atylised
benefita system implies that the first part of someone's budget set is
horizontal only if partner's earnings and other family income are low or
zero.
Table 1. Sample statistics
Variable (Description) Mean St. dev. Number
NCH (number of children) 1.09 1.12 2859
DCH~6 (dummy children younger than 6) 0.28 0.45 2859
ACEM (age husband) 41.13 11.05 2859
AGEF (age wife) 38.63 11.02 2859
EDLM (education level, husband) 2.72 1.08 2859
EDLF (education level, wife) 2.34 0.9~ 2859
CHB (child benefits) 33.55 47.65 2859
OFI (other family income) 39.47 147.90 2859
WBM (before tax wage rate, husband) 26.71 17.35 2176
WBF (before tax wage rate, wife) 18.46 8.83 989
HM (working hours per week, husbandM) 35.42 17.88 2839
HF (working houra per week, wife~) 9.68 14.66 2842
DEM (dummy employed, husband) 0.84 0.36 2859
DEF (dummy employed, wife) 0.40 0.49 2859
': including non-workers
Pearson Correlation Ccefficients
HF WBM WBF DEM DEF OFI
HM o.i4 -0.12 0.03 0.86 0.14 -o.z8
xF -0.04 0.03 0.15 0.82 -0.08




In order to obtain wage rate predicions for non-workers and for workers
whose wage rate is not observed, we heve estimated wage equations for males-9-
and females. Selection bias was taken into account in the usual way, by
adding a reduced form participation equation and allowing for non-zero
correlation between the two equationa (cf. Heckmen, 1979). The two equationx
model wsa then estimated by maximum likelihood, for males and females
aeparately. The endogenous wage variable we used was the log of before tax
hourly earnings. Explanatory variables include dummies for the education
levels, age veriablea, the minimum wage, and the regional unemployment rate.
Estimation results are mentioned in table 2.
We find a significantly negatíve correlation ccefficient for males and
an insignificant one for females. Eatimated alope ccefficients are generally
in line with common findings. The wage rate increeaes with the education
level and with age and, according to the product terms, the increase with
age is strongest for the highest education levels. The impact of the
regional unemployment rate is insignificant. The impact of the minimum wage
rate on the wage rate seems very high, particularly for females. However,
the minimum wage by law only variea with age, and thus this regressor may
simply correct for the imperfect fit of the log quadratic age pattern.
4. Estimation Resulta Basic Model
The model introduced in aection 2 has been estimated by maximum
likelihood, using the full sample of 2859 familiea. Unobserved wage rates
were replaced by wage rate predictions based upon the estimates in table 2,
without taking account of the error term in the wage equation. Included
family characteriatica in (2.2) are the number of children (NCH), a dummy
for children younger than aix (DCHC6), the male's log age (LAGE) and log age
aquared (L2AGE) (in p2), and the female's log age and log age squared (in g
and a~3). pl and the ai~'s other than a23 are assumed not to depend on
family characteriatics. Estimation results are mentioned in table 3, both
for IL-12 and
mind-5
(25 choice opportunities), and IL-10 and
mind-6 (36
choice opportunities).
Most of the parameter estimates for the two cases correspond rather
well to eachother, in particular the slope parameters including family
characteristics. There are some relativily large and significant differences
between the estimated a's. In general, estimated standard errors are
remarkably small, and many parameters are significantly different from zero.
Since parameter estimates by themselves in thia model are not very
informative, some more computations are necessary to interpret the results.-10-
Table 2: Wage rates and participation model
Males Females
parameter t-value parameter t-value
Participation Eguation
Constent -73.82 -11.53 -34.81 -6.39
DED2 0.36 3.78 0.21 2.89
DED3 -0.01 -0.01 1.12 1.41
DED4 -2.67 -2.13 0.69 0.54
DEDS -2.48 -1.99 0.83 0.62
LAGE (- log age) 45.66 11.42 21.15 6.24
L2AGE (a LAGE squared) -6.48 -11.93 -3.16 -6.77
DED3'LAGE 0.19 0.76 -0.17 -0.76






0.11 1.38 0.13 2.17
-0.84 0.51 -1.31 -0.90
-2.12 -2.89 -0.02 -0.03
0.08 1.89 -0.26 -8.32
-0.29 -2.68 -0.77 -10.51
Log Wage rate Eguation
Constant -10.56 -6.82 -1.17 -0.59
DED2 0.07 2.74 0.05 1.45
DED3 -0.51 -2.00 -0.42 -1.23
DED4 -2.03 -6.17 -1.33 -2.85
DED5 -1.86 -5.57 -i.zi -2.57
LAGE 6.70 7.02 1.02 0.81
L2AGE -0.92 -6.94 -0.14 -0.82
DED3MLAGE o.20 2.83 o.i5 1.62






0.08 4.85 0.09 3.67
-0.73 -1.66 0.34 0.51
0.57 3.67 0.84 3.21
0.35 95.83 0.33 61.56
-0.54 -9.78 o.ii 0.94
Explanation.
The education variable ED rangea from 1(lowest level) to 5(highest
level). The variables DED2, DED3, DED4 and DED5 are dummies for the
corresponding levels (DED3-1 if ED-3 and DE3-0 otherwise, etc.)
DWEST is a dummy variable indicating whether the family lives in the
western part of The Netherlands (with largest population and industrial
density).
UNEldPR is the unemployment rate (males and females jointly) in the region;
11 regions (provincea) are distinguished.
WMIN is the log of the before tax minimum wege (in DFL) fixed by law.
a(~) is the standard deviation of the error term in the wage equation.
p denotes the correlation ccefficient between the error terms ín the
participation equation and the wage equation.-11-
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param, t-value param. t-value
-0.850 -3.20 -1.084 -3.82
-3.030 -8.25 -1.808 -5.12
0.125 0.31 1.593 4.42
log lm) 0.145 0.61 -0.307 -1.25
1og lf) -2.226 -9.54 -2.318 -10.16
x log lf) 5.319 2.47 5.oi9 2.53
x log lf x lage) -2.585 -2.14 -2.582 -2.32
x 1og 1f x 12age) 0.361 2.14 0.364 2.33
x log lf x nch) -0.500 -2.46 -0.438 -2.30
x log lf x dch~ó) -1.655 -3.56 -1.765 -4.22
Pi (log c) 33.472 5.11 41.158 6.02
~20 (log lm) 158.440 6.87 146.341 6.96
~21 (log lm x lege) -80.688 -6.72 -74.904 -6.81
~22
(1og 1m x 12age) 11.509 6.98 10.693 7.07
s~3 (log lm X nch) 3.681 2.12 3.209 1.97
~24 (log lm x dch(6) 14.850 3.76 15.809 4.46
s3o (log if) 106.523 4.04 82.866 3.40
S31 (log lf x lage) -52.182 -3.60 -42.818 -3.19
p3~ (log lf x 12age) 8.434 4.14 7.046 3.74
g33 (log lf x nch) 5.201 3.42 4.589 3.27
p34 (log lf x nchó) 15.854 4.51 16.364 5.24
It is easy to check that (2.4) is satisfied for all semple observations,
i.e. utility increasea with consumption. Economic theory is thus supported
by the estimatea. (2.3) is satisfied For most semple obaervations: According
to the estimates based on minda5 ~d mindaó, the utility function is not
quasi-concave at 0.8x and 6.3x of all sample points, respectively. These
observations are high income familiea in which the wife has a full-time job.
Note that in the traditional model, this finding would not have been
possible, since quasi-concavity of U would have been imposed a prfori to-12-
guarentee coherency, i.e. a unique solution of the system of tangency
condltions and inequality conatrainta.
It can be shown that the eatimated effecta of femily size, children
younger than six and age on preferencea for leisure all correspond to
intuition. The ccefficienta of NCH and DCHC6 imply a negative impact on
female labour aupply. Ceterts partbus, labour supply decreases with age for
most males and females. In figure 1, some indifference curves are drawn, for
fixed working houra of one of the spouses. Solid lines refer to mind-5 and
dashed linea refer to mindió. Comparison of the curvee gives some idea about
the differences between the two seta of point estimates. Differences between
curves for families of different composition confirm the stylised fact that
the impact of family composition is much larger for femalea than for males.
Moreover, the difference between the ahapes of the curves for males and
femalea suggest that the eleaticity of aubstitution is much larger for
females than for males, implying that females have larger own wage rate
elasticities than males. Finally, the concave parts of some of the dashed
curves are in line with the fact that according to the mind-6 estimates, U
is not quasi-concave at all sample points.
Elasticities for the average family, i.e. the family with average
characteristics, wage rates and other income, are presented in table 4. We
preaent 12 elasticities: of the huabend's end the wife's hours worked and of
the huaband's and wife's participation probability, with respect to the
before tax wage rates of husband and wife, and with respect to other family
income. The tax and benefits system described in section 3 is fully taken
into account.
In order to be able to judge the preciaeness of the estimates, i.e. to
teke account of the standard errors of the parameter estimates, the
elasticities are calculated 100 times, for 100 independent draws of the
parameter values from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the estimator
of the parameter vector. For each case, we present the median elesticity,
end the first and ninth decile. The last two columns cen thus be interpreted
as the bounds of a two sided 80X confidence interval. The elasticity
estimates appear to be quite accurate, corresponding to the small standard
errors of most parameter estimates. Moreover, in all 12 cases the confidence
intervals corresponding to the two sets of estimates overlap, which suggests
that the error made by grouping working hours into a limited number of
categories dces not affect the results too much.C1g. 1: luu~tterauce ~urves D'Q51(: MaaeL
hm
Family without children; hf-20
hf
hm
Family withone child younger than six; hf-20
Familywithout children; hm-40 ~ Family wilh one child younger than six; hm-40-14-
All own wege eleaticities are aignificantly poaitive on the lOx level.
Corresponding to earlier findinga for The Netherlands, the own wage
aenaitivity of femalea is larger then for malea. The effect of an increase
in the own wage largely tekes place through an increasing participation
probability. Crosa wage elasticities of hours worked are aignificantly
negative, both for males end femalea, suggeating that male and female
leisure are aubatitutea. Crosa wage aenaitivity appeara to be much smaller
than own wage eensitivity. Surpriaingly, the eleaticity of the participation
probability of the huaband with reapect to the female wage rate is
aignificantly positive, and the eatimate aeema extremely accurate. The
elasticity of male labour supply with respect to other family income is
amall but aignificantly negative. Surprisingly, the female's other income
elasticity ia even amaller and not significently different from zero.
Table 4: Elasticities for
mind~5' wege rate male
median Q10 Q90
hm 0.131 0.113 0.151
hf -0.096 -0.157 -0.037
pm 0.090 0.083 0.098




hm 0.153 0.136 0.172
hf -0.171 -0.237 -0.116
pm o.098 0.090 0.107
pf -0.158 -0.208 -0.111
the average family~ Basic Model
wege rate female other family income
median Q10 Q90 median Q10 Q90
-0.044 -0.051 -0.037 -0.038 -0.041 -0.035
0.937 0.880 0.985 -0.001 -0.011 O.oo9
0.014 0.013 0.016 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
0.704 0.669 0.739 0.001 -0.008 0.008
wege rate female other family income
medien Q10 Q90 median Q10 Q90
-0.036 -O.o42 -0.030 -0.034 -O.o37 -0.030
i.o27 0.961 1.078 -O.oo9 -0.018 0.001
0.013 0.012 0.015 -0.002 -0.003 -o.ooi
0.776 0.738 0.813 -0.006 -0.014 O.oo1
Explanation:
hm: working houra males; hf: working houra femalea
pm: participation rate males; pf: participation rate females
Q10: first decile; Q90: nínth decile
The resulta obtained so far aeem quite satisfactory. Economic theory
is aupported end most elasticity eatimatea correspond to our expectations.
Still, table 5 shows that the model hardly fits the data at all. In this
table, we present actuel and simulated bivariate cell frequencies of male
and female labour supply, and marginal cell frequenciea for males and
femalea aeparately.7~ The table showa that both models strongly-15-
miapredict most cell frequenciea. This problem alread,y ariaee at the
univariate level, for males as vell as females.
Table 5: Observed and Predicted Cell Freguenciea Basic Model
hm hf actual prediction h actuel prediction
mind-5 mind'6 mind'S mind'6
0 0 12.845 4.899 5.406 males:
o l0 0.814 0.989 0.938 0 15.959 6.194 6.605
0 20 1.062 0.208 0.176 10 0.637 6.827 6.119
0 30 0.460 0.057 0.046 20 2.052 11.450 8.922
0 40 0.602 0.027 o.oz3 30 2.654 23.157 18.294
0 50 0.177 0.014 0.016 40 58.033 31.027 z9.205
50 20.665 21.345 30.854
l0 0 0.354 4.636 4.396
10 10 0.071 1.174 0.958 females:
l0 20 0.000 0.496 0.365 ~.783 50.239 53.7~
l0 30 0.035 0.280 o.i99 10 8.988 21.872 20.723
10 40 0.177 0.155 0.117 20 11.253 12.239 10.744
l0 5o O.ooo 0.086 0.084 30 5.909 7.143 6.081
40 10.510 4.710 4.269
20 0 1.062 5.368 4.535 50 1.557 3.797 4.482
20 l0 0.142 2.601 1.935
20 20 0.4z5 1.652 1.139
20 30 0.071 0.950 0.632
20 40 0.283 0.545 0.381
20 50 0.071 0.334 0.300
30 0 1.415 10.204 8.660
3o io 0.177 5.558 4.253
30 20 0.354 3.378 2.404
30 30 0.425 1.958 1.341
30 40 0.212 1.207 0.864
30 50 0.071 0.851 0.772
40 0 33.652 14.481 14.517
40 l0 6.299 7.044 6.393
40 20 6.582 4.071 3.460
40 30 3.963 2.417 1.978
40 40 6.900 1.645 1.397
40 50 0.637 1.370 1.459
50 0 12.456 10.652 16.186
50 l0 1.486 4.505 6.245
50 zo 2.831 2.433 3.z~
50 30 0.955 1.481 1.885
50 40 2.335 1.132 1.487
50 50 0.602 1.141 1.850
Explanation:
hm, hf: hours categories males and females:
o: 0-5, 10: 6-15, 20: 16-25, 30: 26-35. 40: 36-45, 50: ~45.
actual: sample fraction (in x)
predicted: predicted fraction (in X). uaing the estimatea in table 3.
malea, females: marginal distributions.-16-
For both sexes, the rate of non-participation ia underpredicted, as
well as the number of people working 31-42 houra a week, the interval
which includes the common full-time working week in the Netherlands. The
number of part-time workers is strongly overpredicted, es well as the
number of people working more then 42 hours per week.
The misfit of the model is easily affírmed formally, using a chi-
squared diagnostic test (cf. Andrews, 1988): The explained sum of squares
of a regression of a vector ( 1,..,1)'ERn, where n is the number of
observations, on the vectora of differences between obaerved and predicted
cell frequencies and the score vectors, follows, under the null hypothesís
of no misspecification, a chi-aquared distribution with m degreea of
freedom.8)
The finding that the standard model cannot explain the peaks in the
hours distribution is not new and has been used to motivate models
incorporating explicit houra restrictions in the individual neoclassical
labour aupply model (cf., e.g., Dickens and Lundberg, 1985, and 1~mmera
and Woittiez, 1991), the results of which suggest that there are too few
part-time joba. Apparently, our approach of grouping working hours into
rather broad intervals of 10 or 12 hours per week dces not solve this
problem.
One wey to extend the model without leaving the fremework sketched in
section 3, is to ellow more parameters to depend on individuel
characteristics. Lagrange multiplier tests suggeat that in particular
a22
end a33 depend on individual charactersitica. Reestimating the model with
flexible a22 end a33 indeed yields a statistically better fit ( in terms of
a log likelihood ratio test and several t-test. Estimated elasticities for
the average family differ somewhat from those in table 3. For example, the
80X confidence intervals (IL-10,
mind-6)
for the own wage elasticities of
hours worked are [0.0~8, 0.108] for males and (1.104, 1.1~6] for females.
Qualitative conclusions remain unchanged. The number of observetions
at which utility is not convex increases to 12.4x of the sample.
Monotonicity of U in c remains satisfied for all observations. Extending
the model in this direction however does not change the conclusions from
table 5: The misfit between actual and simulated cell frequencies remains
as apparent as before.9)-17-
5. Extensions
In this aection we diacuas three extensiona of the basic model
introduced above. The extensiona ahould meet three major shortcomings of
the basic model. First, it does not fit the data, in the senae that the
number of part-time jobs is atrongly underpredicted. Secondly, it treata
the problem of unobserved wage ratea in en unsatisfactory way. In the
third place, it does not ellow for random preferences. We shall first
deacribe the three extensions, and then discusa the empirical results of
models incorporating one or more of the extensiona.
Hours restrictionm
The fact that the basic model cannot capture the data has become
apparent from table 5. A poasible explenation ia that it dces not account
for the lack of evailable part-time joba. In the bsaic model, no
diatinction has been made between full-time end part-time Jobs. Several
explanationa for the lack of part-time joba can be given. Because of fixed
costa of hiring workers, or, equivalently, íncreasing returns to scale of
the worker's production, employers may be reluctant to hire part-time
workera. This may be an incentive to offer lower wages to part-time
workera. Results of 1~mmers snd Woittiez (1991) auggest that thia is
indeed the case to some extent, but that thia is not enough to explain the
lack of part-time jobs. The reason may be the fact that, at lesat in the
Netherlanda, most wagea are largely determined by collective bargaining
between unions and employer orgenisations in sectors, and resulting
agreements generally do not allow to discriminate between full-time and
part-time workera. In this paper, we have assumed that before tex wege
ratea do not depend on houra worked and thus do not allow for wage
discrimination of part-time workers.
Fmployers may also aimply not offer part-time joba or refuse to hire
part-time workera. As a conaequence, part-time joba will be acarce and
average search costs for a part-time job will be relatively high. Dickens
and Lundberg (1985) have incorporated this idea explicitly into a model of
labour supply in a framework with a limited number of job offers, in which
most people are restricted in the choice of their working hours. It has
been shown (Tummers and Woittiez, 1991, Van Sceat et al., 1990) that auch
a model fits the data much better than the standard model. Still, with no
information used on the actusl numer of Job offers or the reatrictions-18-
individuals actually face, eatimation of the job offer mechanism is based
upon indirect information (on actual working hours) only. The question
arises whether explaining the phenomena in the data require this whole
extra (reduced form) branch of the model.
The multinomial logit framework we use in this paper allows for a
much aimpler approach: we include aternative specific constant terms for
the alternativea in which either the male or the female works part-time.
These constants reflect monetary or non-monetary drawbacka of working
part-time, e.g. search coata of part-time jobs (which, in our static
framework, obviously cannot be incorporated explicitly), or unattractive
job characteristics. If minds6 and ILz10, this implies that six extra
parameters are included. Equation (2.5) is replaced by
u~~ u(c~.lmf,lf~) . rm(lm3) 4 rf(lf~) ~ E~ (~-1,....36). (4.1)
where, for s-m,f,
Ys(ls)-ysk if hs~80-1s-10k, k-1,2,3,
(4.2)
YS(ls)~0 otherwise
The Ysk~s (szm,f, k-1,2,3) are expected to be negative; -7~sk reflects the
'disutility' of e part-time job.
Aa in the Dickens and Lundberg model, the assumptions that the extra
paremeters do not depend on characteristics such as wage rates, education
level, family composition, etc. is ad hoc, end implicitly reflects the
assumption that hours restrictions are homogeneous across the labour
market. It implies that the relative lack of part-time jobs is
uncorrelated with these characteristics.
A drawback of introducing the alternative specific parameters is that
the parameterisation depends on the chosen wey in which working hours are
categorised. For dif'ferent values of mind ~d IL, a different number of
parameters must be used, and results for various values of mind can no
longer be compared. The same drawback is implicitly present in the Dickens
and Lundberg model. If mind is large, it may be worthwile to circumvent
this problem by further parameterising the ysk's. This is put into
practice in one of the empirical models discussed below.-i9-
Errora in wage rate predicitonm
One of the problems with the type of labour aupply models discuased
above is that before tax wage rates of many individuals, including all
non-workers, are not observed. The uausl approach ia to replace wage ratea
of non-workers by wage rate predictions, whereas for workers, actual wage
rates are used (cf., e.g., most papers in Moffitt, 1990e). The estimates
discussed in section 3 are based upon this approach. The approach in
principle dces not lead to consiatent estimates, since it assumea that
wage rates of non-workere are predicted without error (cf., e.g., MaCurdy
et al., 1990).
Another ad hoc alternative ia to use predicted wege rates for
workers as well as non-workers. Because of the non-linearities in the
model and the chosen distribution of the error terms, this would only
yield consistent estimates if all femilies based their decision on (our)
predictiona instead of on their actual wage ratea. This seems an
implausible assumption, in particular since there will be variables known
to the individual end helpful for predicting, but not present in our data.
In this aection, we explicitly take account of the fact that
unobserved wage rates are predicted with error. The estimation reaults in
table 2 were already uaed to construct wage rate predictions. Now, we also
uae the estimated standard deviations of the error terms in these wage
equations to take account of prediction errora. The labour supply model
itself essentislly remains unchanged. Moreover, we retain the assumption
that the error terms in the wage equations and the error terms in (2.5)
are independent, and thus do not allow for the poasible endogeneity of
before tax wage rates. We come back to this in section 6.
In order to describe the way in which the prediction errors are
incorporated, we rewrite the model in rather general terma. The labour
supply model yielda probabilities of working hours combinationa of huaband
end wife as a function of before tax wage ratea of husband end wife (Wbm
and Wbf) and several femily characteristics (X), including other family
income:
Pr[(hm.hf)~(hm~.hf~)) ' F~(Wbm,Wbf,X) (jal,....m). (~.3)
where F~ is given by (2.6). The index indicating the family is suppressed.
The likelihood contribution in case of observed Wbmo and Wbfo and choice
(hm~ob,hf~ob) is given by-20-
L ~ Fjob(wbmo.Wbfo.X) (4.4)
Measurement errors in Wbmo and Wbfo are thus ignored. The eetimated wage
equationa for males and females are given by
log Wbs ~ Zens . na (s-m,f) (4.5)
where Zm and Zf are vectors of individual characteriatica (cf. table 2)
and ~ and qf are unobserved error terms. In the previous section, we
replaced Wbm and Wbfo in (4.4), if they were not observed, by Wbmp-
exp(Zmrtm) and Wbfp- exp(Zfrtf), thus ignoring ~ and~or nf. However, for
given probability density p of (Wbm,Wbf), conditional on Zm and Zf and
determined by nm and rtf and the density of (~,m,nf), the correct likelihood
contribution in case none of the wage rates are observed is given by
L S 0 0 Fjob(~m,Wbf,X) p(Wbm,Wbf) dwbm dWbf (4.6)
Similar expreasions, involving a single integral, can be given if either
Wbm or Wbf is not observed.
In general, (4.6) cannot be written as a sum of normal probabilities,
end computation of L requirea numerical integration. There are various
ways in which this cen be avoided. The firat is to derive a simulated
moment estimator, generalising McFadden's (1989) estimator for the
multinomísl probit model. This implies that in the first order conditions
corresponding to maximizing the likelihood, scores must be replaced by
fixed instrumenta, and that probabilities or partisl derivatives of
probabilitiea are replaced by smooth unbiased simulators. McFadden shows
that the resulting estimator is conaistent, irrespective of the number of
replications per individual on which the simulators are based.l0)
M easier alternative, also based on replacing expectations by
simulated means, is to approximate the integral in (4.6) by
'` 1 R
-Rs R ~ Fjob(Wbmr.Wbfr.X)
r-1
(4.7)
where (Wbml,Wbf1),...,(WbmR,WbfR) are R independent draws from the
distribution of (Wbm,Wbf) ( conditional on Zm and Zf). Similarly, if only
the husband's wage rate is unobserved, L is replaced by-21-
R
LRa R F F~ob(Wbmr,Wbfo,X)
r~l
(4.8)
end an analogoue expression can be given if oniy Wbf is observed. The
approximate likelihood function is maximised, in which, for non-workera,
L is replaced by L.R ( see Lerman and Manaki, 1981, and Oourieroux end
Monfort, 1990). The resulting eatimator is inconaiatent for fixed R but
will be conaiatent if R tends to infinity with the number of observations.
If R tends to infinity at a large enough rate (i. e., to be preciae, if
n~R} tends to 0), the asymptotic diatributiona of approximate ML estimator
and exact ML estimator coincide. In fact, for a fixed number of
observationa, the estimator will converge to the ML-estimator if R tends
to infinity.
Randos preferencem
Because of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives asaumption
implicitly present in the multinomial logit model, the e~'s in (2.5)
cannot be interpreted as random preferencea due to unobserved family
characteristics. Rendom preferencea can be incorporated explicitly by
edding en error term to some of the paremeters, for exemple S end ~, 2 3
corresponding to the linear terma of male and female leisure in the direct
utility function. We thus replace the expressions for p2 and p3 in (2.2)
by
~i s f~ikxlc ~ T1, 1~2.3 (4.9)
where we assume that ;2 and ;3 are mutuelly independent, independent of
other errors in the model, homoskedastic, and normally distributed with
mean 0. Conditional on ;2 and ;3, we retain the same labour supply model
as before, including the IIA assumption. The probabilities unconditional





where pT denotes the probability density function of (;2,;3).IInobserved rendom preferencea thus complicate ML estimation in a
similar way as unobserved wage rate components. Expresaions for the
likelihood involve s complicated bivariate integral if both wage rates are
observed. If, for example, neither of the two wage rates are observed, the
combination of the previous extension with random preferences leads to the
following expression for the likelihood contribution:
L' I I I.Í Ffob(Wbm,Wbf.X~32.;3)P;(32.b3)P(Wbm.Wbf)d;2d;3dWbm dWbf
0 0 -m-m
(4.11)
where F~ob(Wbm,Wbf,X~;2,;3) is defined as before, but now conditional on
(;2,;3). The integral in (4.11) can, as before, be approximated by
I.- 1 R
-R- R r~i Fjob(Wbmr,Wbfr.X~T2r.33r) (4.12)
Here
(Wbmi,Wbfi,;2r,;3r),...,(WbmR,WbfR32r'33r) are R independent draws
from the distribution of (Wbm,Wbf,;2,;3) (conditional on Zm and Zf).
Similar expressions can easily be obtained for the case that one of the
two wage ratea is observed.
Estimation Reaults
Eatimation results of various extended versions of the model are
presented in table 6. All results are based upon minda6 end IL-10, i.e.
the family's choice set consists of 36 alternatives. The first column
refers to the basic model with extra paremeters to reflect hours
restrictions (cf. equations 4.1-4.2). The error structure is thus the same
as in the basic model and exact ML estimation is used. The estimates for
pi and for the ai~'s which are not allowed to depend upon family
characteristica, atrongly differ from those in table 3, and so do some of
their significance levels.
The parameters related to family characteristics however are largely
in accordance with the earlíer findings. The estimates of the a's end ~'s
imply that utility (the ~rak's, s-m,f, k-1,2,3, not teken into account) is
an increasing function of family income for all observations. The
estimated utility function is increasing in family consumption and quasi-
concave for 99.9X of all observations in the sample.-23-
Table 6: Estimation reaults extended modela
I IIa (R~5) IIb (R:10) III (R~10)
ar. t-vai. ar. t-vai. par. t-val. ar. t-val.
a 0.189 0.6 -1.3 2 -3.97 -1.380 -3.99 -1. 15 - .
a22 -4.003 -11.05 -5.038 -13.25 -4.977 -13.03 -5.118 -13.17
a -6.618 -io.oo -6.970 -10.53 -6.957 -i0.5o -7.030 -io.55
a12 1.z48 4.80 0.087 0.32 0.094 0.34 0.016 0.06
ai3 -0.733 -3.03 -1.558 -6.40 -1.601 -6.46 -1.668 -6.74
a 5.126 2.47 4.187 z.o2 4.170 2.00 4.i43 1.97
a230 -2.i48 -1.86 -2.038 -1.75 -2.044 -1.75 -2.070 -1.75
a231 0.286 1.76 0.274 1.68 0.275 1.68 0.278 1.68
a232 -0.497 -2.61 -0.481 -2.50 -0.471 -2.45 -0.476 -2.47
a234 -1.574 -3-76 -1.459 -3.47 -1.468 -3.49 -1.443 -3.43
~i -3.bo5 -0.50 32.o2i 4.09 32.93i 4.11 34.468 4.z9
s2o 125.474 5.78 i48.631 6.67 i50.631 6.68 152.496 6.71
~2i -67.945 -5.96 -64.698 -5.59 -65.938 -5.66 -65.546 -5.57
~22 9.716 6.20 9.237 5.81 9.411 5.87 9.366 5.79
~24 i3.945 3.93 12.953 3.64 13.038 3.66 12.822 3.60
P3o i31.329 5.17 152.627 5.97 151.613 5.94 153.957 5.98
P31 -49.787 -3.64 -50.880 -3.71 -49.912 -3.64 -50.127 -3.63
~3~ 8.066 4.2i 8.195 4.26 8.061 4.19 8.099 4.17
H33 5.066 3.60 4.932 3.47 4.856 3.42 4.899 3.45









-3.742 -i4.8i -3.740 -15.OZ -3.734 -i4.99 -3.738 -15.01
-3.143 -22.67 -3.133 -22.52 -3.131 -22.45 -3.130 -22.48
-3.256 -26.26 -3.238 -26.05 -3.237 -z6.o3 -3.235 -25.99
-1.805 -20.14 -i.8o1 -20.21 -1.800 -20.19 -1.798 -20.09
-1.365 -11.74 -1.358 -11.73 -1.358 -11.74 -1.354 -11.67




I: Model with paremetera reflecting hours reatrictions ( (4.1)-(4.2));
imputed wage rates for non-workers
II: Model with parametera reflecting hours restrictions; wage rate
prediction errors taken into account; approximate ML-eatimates uaing
(4.7)-(4.8)
III: II extended with random preferencea; approximate ML-estimates uaing
(4.i2)
All estimates for the rsk's (sam,f, k~1,2,3) are significantly negative.
This confirms the interpretation that they reflect hours restrictions and
strongly suggests that the model including theae parameters is an
improvement with respect to the basic model. This conclusion is easily
confirmed using either one of the familiar tests for the null that all
7sk~s-24-
are equal to zero (Lagrenge Multiplier, Wald or Likelihood Ratio test; the
null is strongly rejected by either of these).
Table 7 can be compared to table 5. It contains actusl and simulated
bivariate and univariate cell frequencies of hours worked. The results for
the model at hand (model I) auggeat that we have indeed to a large extent
achieved what this extension of the model was deaigned for: This model fits
the data much better than the basic model, in the sense that ectual and
predicted cell frequencies are quite similar. It should however be admitted,
that the model specification is atill rejected by chi-squared diagnostic
tests similar to those discussed in section 3.
Table 8 presenta 80z-confidence bounds for the elasticities of the
average family, computed in the ssme way as in teble 4. The hours
restrictions parameters are fully taken into account. Comparing the upper
panel of the table-with the outcomea in table 4 shows that incorporating the
hours restrictions parameters indeed significantly changes the conclusions
about some of the elasticities. In particular, the female's own wage rate
elasticity is much smaller than before (between 0.4~ and 0.60 instead of
between 0.88 and o.98). cross wage elastícities also decrease in absolute
value, the effect of the husband's wage rate on the wife's hours no longer
being significant. Elasticities with respect to other family income remain
very small. Surprisingly, the impact of other income on the wife's working
hours is now significantly positive,ll)
The Model II eatimates in table 6 refer to the model in which not only
hours restrictions parameters are included, but also prediction errors are
taken into account in wage rates of individuals whose wage rate is not
observed. The likelihood function is approximated using (4.7) and (4.8),
with R-5 (Model IIa) and R-10 (Model IIb). We used the estimation results
for the wage equations mentioned in table 2, and assumed that the error
terms in husband's and wife's wage equation are independent.12) The fect
that paremetera in the wage equation are estimated is not taken into account
in computing the standard errors of Lhe labour supply model parameter
estimates. Theae standard errors might therefore be alightly
underestimated.l3)
Paremeter eatimates for both R-5 and R-10 are mentioned in table 6. The
two sets of paremeter estimates are very similar, suggesting that R-5
already yields reasonable accuracy, even though, according to theory,
consistency of the approximate ML-estimator requires R to tend to infinity
with the number of observations. We have not obtained estimates based upon
larger values of R.i4j On the other hend, differences with model I seem-25-
quite substantiel and significant, at leeat for the ai~'s and for pl,
suggeating that taking wage rate prediction errors into account doea make a
difference. The estimates for the alope coefficienta with reapect to family
characteriatics again are very well in line with the reeults obtained
earlier. Moreover, the hours restrictions parameter eatimates are virtuelly
identical to those for model I. The model IIa eatimates imply that the
dírect utility function would be decreasing in femily consumption at 3.3X of
ell semple points. For these observations, the micro-economic foundation of
the model ia lost. At 0.4x of semple points, indifference aurfaces are not
convex.
Predicted cell frequencies for model IIs are presented in table 7. Thoae
for model IIb are virtuelly identical to those for model IIs and therefore
not presented. The extent to which modela IIa end IIb fit the data appears
to be quite similar to the model I case. Chi-squared diagnostic test results
are also similar, and suggest that the model is still misspecified.
Comparing the confidence bounds of elasticities for the R~5 end R~10
case, presented in table 8, again shows that modela IIa and IIb yield
virtually identical results. Surprisingly, the confidence intervals are not
very different from those corresponding to model I, even though some of the
parameter eatimates do differ. The husband's labour supply elasticity with
reapect to other family income is significantly negative but small, whereas
the wife's is now again inaignificant.15)
Resulta for the model with explícit rendom preferencea ; and ; are 2 3
presented in the righthand column of table 6(model III). We have assumed
that ;2 and ;3 are independent. Approximate ML was used, beaed upon (4.12)
and similar likelihood contributiona in case of obaerved wage rates. Hours
restrictiona were also allowed for. Again, results obtained with R-5 and
Ra10 appeared to be virtuslly identical. We present results for R-10 only.
Differences with the model II resulta are minor. The estimates for the
standard deviations of the random preference terms seem rather inaccurate,
and the importance of incorporating these errors is not confirmed,l6)
Correspondingly, confidence bounda for elasticitiea are also quite aimilar
to those obtained for the previous apecification (cf. table 8). Apparently,
the large number of error terms already in the model (one for each of the 36
alternatives) makes it hard to diatinguish aeparate rendom preference terms,
even though the specification of the other errors ia restrictive and implies
IIA. Obviously, allowing for more flexibility with respect to the way in
which random preferencea are incorporated, might change this result. It
remains for instance to be checked whether ;m and ;f are independent of-z6-
eachother and of the ~ and nf, which might reflect similar unobserved
individuel or family characteristics.
Table 7: Observed and Predicted Cell Freguencies; F~ctended Modela
hm hf actual prediction
model I model IIe
males.
0 0 12.845 12.243 12.154 hm actuel model I model IIa
0 10 0.814 1.35z 1.263
0 20 1.062 1.133 1.043 0 15.959 15.842 15.612
0 30 0.460 0.419 0.428 lo 0.637 0.635 0.632
0 40 0.602 0.628 0.653 20 2.052 2.048 2.056
0 50 0.177 0.067 0.072 3o z.654 2.645 2.662
40 58.033 58.063 58.273
lo 0 0.354 0.411 0.406 50 20.665 20.768 20.766
10 10 0.071 0.053 0.052
10 20 0.000 0.067 0.068 females:
10 30 0.035 0.037 0.038 hf actual model I model IIa
l0 40 0.177 0.059 0.061
io 50 0.00o O.oo6 O.oo7 0 61.783 61.494 61.336
10 8.988 9.113 9.121
20 0 1.062 1.124 1.134 20 11.z53 11.368 ii.394
20 10 0.142 o.i94 0.194 30 5.909 5.935 5.965
20 20 0.425 0.288 0.286 40 10.51o i0.527 1o.óii
zo 30 0.071 0.158 o.i56 50 1.557 1.563 1.572
20 40 0.283 0.254 0.255
20 50 0.071 0.029 0.031
30 0 1.415 i.457 1.463
30 l0 0.177 0.256 0.259
30 20 0.354 0.364 0.365
30 30 0.425 0.197 0.197
30 40 o.21z o.328 0.334
30 50 0.071 0.042 0.044
40 0 33.652 33.504 33.442
40 10 6.299 5.424 5.493
40 20 6.58z 7.z65 7.340
40 30 3.963 3.9i9 3.937
40 40 6.9~ 6.937 7.024
40 50 0.637 1.014 1.037
50 0 12.456 12.754 12.737
50 l0 1.486 1.834 1.860
50 20 2.83i z.251 2.293
50 30 0.955 1.204 1.210
50 40 2.335 2.32i 2.284
50 50 0.602 0.404 0.382
Explanation.
hm, hf: houra categories males and females:
o: 0-5, 10: 6-15, 20: i6-25. 30: 26-35, 40: 36-45. 50: ~45.
actual: sample fraction (in z)
predicted: predicted fraction ( in X), using the estimates in table 6.
males, females: marginal distributions.-27-





wage rate female other family income
median Q10 Q90 median Q10 Qy0
hm 0.104 0.078 0.122
hf 0.051 -0.049 0.122
pm o.125 0.105 0.143




hm o.073 0.050 0.091
hf 0.011 -0.087 0.077
pm 0.093 0.076 0.111




hm o.076 0.053 0.093
hf o.005 -O.o93 0.072
pm 0.097 0.080 o.ii4




hm 0.064 0.046 0.086
hf o.037 -0.028 o.i26
pm o.085 0.070 0.105
pf o.007 -0.040 0.073
-o.oi5 -0.023 -o.oio -0.026 -o.o3i -o.o2z
0.524 0.470 0.599 0.016 0.004 0.029
-0.004 -0.009 0.001 -0.018 -0.022 -0.014
0.383 0.330 0.426 0.009 -0.001 0.018
wage rate female other femily income
median Q10 Q90 median Q10 Q90
-0.017 -0.025 -0.012 -0.030 -0.035 -0.026
0.453 0.399 0.521 0.009 -0.004 0.020
-0.008 -0.014 -0.004 -0.022 -0.026 -0.018
0.319 0.269 0.365 0.002 -0.008 0.010
wage rate female other femily income
median Q10 Q90 median Q10 Q90
-o.oi7 -0.025 -o.oi2 -0.030 -0.035 -0.026
0.472 0.417 0.543 0.008 -0.005 o.oi9
-0.008 -0.014 -0.003 -o.oz2 -0.027 -0.018
0.335 0.284 0.382 0.001 -0.009 0.009
wage rate female other family income
median Q10 Q90 median Q10 Q90
-0.016 -0.022 -0.012 -0.030 -0.035 -0.025
0.453 0.392 0.522 0.013 0.002 O.oz6
-0.008 -0.013 -0.004 -o.o2z -o.ozó -0.019
0.313 0.257 0.370 0.004 -0.004 o.0i4
Explanation.
hm: working hours males; hf: working houra females
pm: participation rate males; pf: participation rete females
Q10: first decile; Q90: ninth decile
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared several types of models explaining
family labour supply behaviour. In section 2, we have introduced an
alternative for the common neoclasaical approach, based upon grouping
working hours into categories, and utility maximisation over a finite set.
This approach has several adventages in comparison to the traditional model:
It dces not require any a prtort esaumptions for model coherency, it is
computationally more tractable, and it allows for extensions of the standard-28-
model, auch as incorporating a kinked tax syatem, constraints on working
hours, fixed coats of working, etc. Moreover, if the number of categories
increases, the model can be interpreted as an approximation of the more
traditional continuous model.
Estimation results for the basic discrete choice model are discussed in
section 4. From an economic point of view, these results seem quite
satisfactory: The utility function is quasi-concave and increasing with
family consumption, and labour supply elasticity estimates seem rather
accurate and quite reasonable. Still, a simple comparison of obaerved and
predicted hours distribution reveala that the model does not fit the data.
In section 5 we discusa severel extensions. To remove the misfit, we
introduce s few extra parameters which can be interpreted as hours
constraints. Incorporation of these paremeters has a substantiel impact on
elasticity eatimates, and in particular significantly reduces the estimated
female's own wage elasticity.
It ia shown that extensions with more random terms can be handled by
using approximate ML, based upon simulated frequencies, instead of exact ML.
Thus it becomes possible to treat the problem of unobserved wage rates in a
satisfactory way. Moreover, we can explicitly allow for random preferences.
Compared to the first extension however, incorporating these two featues
does not substantislly affect the elasticity estimates.
Obviously, numerous directions remain in which the model can be further
extended. Many of these can easily be implemented in the discrete choice
framework which we use. The relatively large data set available makes such
extensiona worthwile and necessary, if we want the model to be accepted by
simple diagnostic tests. Score tests can be used to investigate which
directions of extension are most promising.
A few examples illustrate this point. In model I, the assumption that
the three hours restrictions parameters for females do not depend upon
family characteristics (LAGEF, L2AGEF, NCH, DCHC6) is strongly rejected.
(the test atatistic is ~~.0, which exceeds 2
X12;0.01'26.2). In particular,
age seems to plsy a role. A similar test for males leads to rejection at the
5X level but acceptance at the lz level (the test statistic being 23.9). In
the same model, the hypothesis that the ccefficients in the utility function
corresponding to the squared quantities
all, a22 and a33 do not depend upon
family characteristics is also rejected (the test statistic being 66.4,
exceeding
x12;0.01)' ~e scores needed for these tests are easily computed,
multiplying scores with respect to the parameter assumed constant with-29-
family characteristics, and do not require new evaluations of the likelihood
function.
In model III, endogeneity of wege ratea cen be accounted for by allowing
for correlation between the error terms in the wage equation and the random
preference terms, i.e. between ~ and ;m end between ~f and ;f. Thia
essentially boila down to including the wage rate residual in the
expressions for g2 and p3. The hypothesis of no correlation is atrongly
rejected (the test statistic is 19.0 and exceeds x2~0.01)' ~e obvious
problem with these tests is that each teat is only feeaible if the type of
misspecification tested for is the only one present. Thus, if many of
these tests lead to rejection of the null, it ia atill hard to know which
alternative should be chosen.
Because of the misspecification which is atill present, the practical
value of calculated elasticitiea is not to clear. The senaitivities of
labour supply with reapect to the own and the partner's wage rates are
rather amall. Moreover, they tend to become amaller the more general and
realistic the model on which their calculation is based becomes. This
auggeats that the true elasticities which we are trying to estimate may
also be rather small. This conjecture is confirmed by the resulta of
estimating one more extension: Model IIs (in aection 5), in which Yfk
(k~1,2,3), i.e. the hours restrictions parameters for females, are sllowed
to depend on the female's characteriatica (LAGE, L2AGE, NCH, DCH6). The
extenaion fits the data significantly better than the original Model IIe
(cf. the LM test result mentioned above). Estimated indifference curves for
the average family (as in aection 3) are drawn in figure 2, both for the
original model IIa end its extension. Differences between the curves do not
aeem to be too large, although some of the curves of the extended model
have a larger curvature, implying lower own wage elasticitiea. This is
confirmed by the 80z-confidence bounda for the male's and female's own wage
elasticities of hours worked, which are given by [-0.005, 0.048] and [0.269,
0.3627, respectively. These elasticitiea are smaller that the Model IIa
estimates in table 8. Income elasticities slightly increase (in abaolute
value), but remain very small.
The temptation thus exists to conclude that the empirical results imply
that the sensitivity of male and female labour supply with respect to wages,
tax rates, and other income is quite small, at least in the atatic








; Model IIa, generalised: ------
hm hm
F~rrnif~ ni".~oul chi!dren: hf 20 ~ Familc with one child ~.ouh~er than six: hf ?0-31-
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Notem
1) Generalisations in which spouses have separate utilíty functions and
are, for example, assumed to reach some Pareto-efficient leiaure-
cer.sumptic.. allacatio sre heyond the scope of 'lii- papar. Sea,
e.g., Chiappori (1991) for a discussion of identification and the
practical value of such models.
2) Due to lack of appropriate data, family expenditures excluding
savings etc. could not be computed. As a conaequence, the model is
purely static and is not consistent with two atage budgetting in a
life cycle fremework (cf., e.g., Blundell, 1990).
3) This is discussed in many papers, starting with Burtless end Hausman
(19~8). See also e.g. Moffitt (1986, 1990b) for overviews.
4) See, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) for a diacussion of
this issue.
5) The income tax reform in 199o has reduced the number of tax brackets
to three for each individual. The non-convexity for married females
however has been retained.
6) Atkinson end Micklewright (1991) stress the importance of
distinguishing between unemployment insurance and unemployment
assistance for the decision whether or not to accept a job offer.
7) The 33 families with male or female workers whose working hours are
not observed ( cf. section 3) are not included.
8) An extra cell has to be included to allow for unobserved poaitive
working hours. Andrews (1988) also discussea generalisations in which
cells are disaggregated using the explanatory variables.
9) Detailed estimation results and the analagons of tables 4 and 5 and
figure 1 are available upon request. Preliminary estimation results
suggest that it is not worthwile to allow the other paremetera,
corresponding to log c or a product with log c, to depend on family
characteristics.
10) See also Hajivassiliou (1991) for a recent aurvey of simulation
estimation methods for a more general class of models.
11) As in aection 3, thia model hea also been estimated with oc22 end oc
ellowed to depend on family charecteristics. Resulting elastici~~
estimates are not very different, though still somewhat smaller (in
absolute value). The other income elasticity for the female's hours
of work remains sígnificantly positive.
12) In principle, it is also possible to eatimate the wage rate equations
and the labour supply model simultaneously. This requires a small
adjustment of the likelihood function only. However, the number of
parameters to be estimated substantially increases. Earlier results
with the aingle individuel model (cf. Van Soest and Kooremen, 1991)
suggest that coefficients in the wage rate equations will hardly
change.-34-
13) Again, reaults in Van Soest end Kooreman (1991) suggeat that this
problem is of minor importance. In the simultaneous model for a
aingle individusl, the correlation matrix between the estimator for
the parameters of the wage equation and the eatimator for the
labour aupply paremeters, appears to be very small.
14) This is due to inaufficient memory space for atoring large matrices
in Fortran, and not to increasing computing tíme requirementa.
15) If a2 and a are further parameterised, basically the seme happens
es wha~ is d~~cribed in footnote 10 for model I: elasticities
slightly fall; the width of the confidence intervala remain aimilar.
16) Standard tests ( LM, LR, Wald) are in principle invalid due to the
one-sided nature of the alternative. Still, any bivariate confidence
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